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ABSTRACT 
Privacy is a concept with real life ties and implications. Privacy 
infringement has the potential to lead to serious consequences for 
the stakeholders involved, hence researchers and organisations 
have developed various privacy enhancing techniques and tools. 
However, there is no solution that fits all, and there are instances 
where privacy solutions could be misused, for example to hide 
nefarious activities. Therefore, it is important to provide suitable 
measures and to make necessary design tradeoffs in order to avoid 
such misuse. This short paper aims to make a case for the need of 
careful consideration when designing a privacy solution, such that 
the design effectively addresses the user requirements while at the 
same time minimises the risk of inadvertently assisting potential 
offenders. In other words, this paper strives to promote Òsensible 
privacyÓ design, which deals with the complex challenges in 
balancing privacy, usability and accountability. We illustrate this 
idea through a case study involving the design of privacy 
solutions for domestic violence survivors. This is the main 
contribution of the paper. The case study presents specific user 
requirements and operating conditions, which coupled with the 
attacker model, provide a complex yet interesting scenario to 
explore. One example of our solutions is described in detail to 
demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues Ð Abuse 
and crime involving computers, Privacy. 
General Terms 
Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Privacy; anonymity; tradeoffs; privacy enhancing technologies; 
privacy in mobile systems; privacy threats; personal privacy; 
domestic violence; survivors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The pervasiveness of digital technology makes our lives easier by 
enabling access to information and services whenever and 
wherever it is required. However, technologies used to access 
services leave a trail of Òelectronic footprintsÓ that can be 
followed by users to keep track of their activities, by service 
providers to provide personalised services to their customers, and 
by authorities to identify and track down perpetrators in case of 
misuse of technology. This leads to issues related to privacy, 
which has become more prominent lately, especially as a result of 
the Snowden revelation [1]. 
Consequently people are growing more aware about the need to 
protect the privacy of their data. Furthermore, there are cases 
where privacy infringement could lead to serious consequences 
such as loss of jobs or life [2]. As such, many researchers have 
spent efforts into creating various techniques and tools to enhance 
the privacy of stakeholders concerned. 
One poignant scenario is the case of domestic violence, in which 
survivorÕs electronic footprints might be tracked by their abuser as 
part of the abuserÕs attempt to monitor and exert control over the 
survivor, strengthening the cycle of harm to the survivor. In this 
scenario, survivors might not have the technical ability to cover 
their tracks and indeed, they often have less confidence in using 
technology compared to their abusive partners [3]. The fear of 
being discovered and of suffering more abuse contributes to 
preventing survivorsÕ access to support services and maintain the 
abusersÕ physical and psychological control over them [4]. 
Therefore, as suggested by the requirements compiled by van 
Moorsel et al. [5], a privacy approach must be accessible, usable 
and useful for survivors and provide the confidence and assurance 
that seeking help is at a lower risk than enduring abusive 
relationships. 
On the other hand, it is sometimes necessary for privacy to be 
breach-able. As with any technological solution, there is a risk 
that some individuals might circumvent the original purpose to 
misuse the solution in nefarious activities. Sharing sexual abuse 
images of children using the ÒDarknetsÓ [6] is one notorious 
example of such misuse. By hiding behind this anonymisation 
service, perpetrators might feel more confident that their activities 
are not detectable by law enforcement agencies, or at least it 
becomes a very tough challenge for child protection officers to 
identify and arrest the perpetrators. 
With this context in mind, we would like to propose a concept of 
sensible privacy with tradeoffs that strive to get a balance between 
privacy, usability, and accountability. This is not to the level of 
implementing backdoors for government or law enforcement 
agencies to snoop in, but instead, a suitable attacker model needs 
to be developed so that a solution can be devised in a way that 
raises the barrier for the attackers, but not prohibiting law 
enforcement officers to carry out their investigative duty. 
DEFINITION 1 (SENSIBLE PRIVACY) In the context of this 
paper, sensible privacy refers to the combination of 
privacy tradeoffs between privacy and usability and 
privacy and accountability. 
Privacy literature covers a series of tradeoffs including those 
made by the user or as design decisions. User tradeoffs include 
cost in exercising privacy versus benefits [7], but could also 
include cost in terms of cognitive effort spent or trust-privacy 
tradeoffs relating to incentives [8]. Design decisions tradeoffs 
include privacy versus utility of data tradeoffs [9] or privacy 
versus accountability tradeoffs [10] also linked with privacy 
versus security [11]. Our definition of sensible privacy combines 
two of the design tradeoffs and is both sensitive to user 
requirements and caters for the potential of misuse. This approach 
does not limit the design to the requirements of only one group of 
stakeholders. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 looks back 
at the basic concept of privacy and presents related work, 
including a selection of popular existing privacy solutions. 
Section 3 serves as the core of the paper, describing a case study 
of designing solutions for domestic violence survivors with 
sensible privacy in mind. This section also presents the key 
challenges faced, the attacker model envisaged, a sample solution 
that addresses the tradeoff needs, and the lessons learned from this 
case study. Section 4 concludes the paper and outlines ideas for 
future work. 
2. PRIVACY AND PRIVACY ENHANCING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Privacy is a behavioral and multi-dimensional concept: 
individuals dynamically manage their privacy according to 
different situations in social life. Privacy enables a dialectical state 
[12] that allows individuals to be both connected and autonomous.  
The interplay of needing both privacy and openness influences the 
decisions individuals make about the way they manage their 
information. As a consequence, they do not usually require 
complete privacy. Rather, they are happy to share information 
with others as long as certain social norms are met, that is 
contextual integrity of the shared information is maintained [13].   
However the concept of ÒprivacyÓ Ð especially in relation to the 
definitions proposed by previous research to explain it in terms of 
data minimisation, e.g. [14] Ð has a strong influence on the work 
presented in this paper. A terminology has been proposed to 
describe privacy in terms of data minimisation [14] in the systems 
domain; that is minimising the collection and processing of 
identifying information when using online services. Using this 
terminology, privacy is defined in terms of anonymity, 
unlinkability, unobservability, and undetectability. Anonymity 
supports the dialectical nature of privacy since it is the state in 
which an agent is able to engage in a transaction with another 
party while not being identifiable within an anonymity set 
consisting of senders, receivers and servers within a 
communication network. It also includes unidentifiability (that is 
observers cannot identify the agent), unlinkability (that is 
observers cannot link the agent to a specific message or action) 
and undetectability (that is observers cannot determine whether 
the message exists or not). 
Many currently available privacy enhancing technologies and 
tools are examples of privacy-by-architecture designs [15]. Many 
serve the purpose of anonymising communication such as Onion 
Routing [16], Hordes [17], Crowds [18], Anonymiser [19], Tor 
[20] and authentication protocols for mobile scenarios [21]. Other 
anonymising techniques include anonymisation of records and 
logs [22] and cookie removal software [23]. As countermeasures 
against surveillance, Free Haven [24], remailers (such as 
mixmaster [25]) and Pretty Good Privacy [26] can be used, while 
live USB/DVD tools such as Tails [27] provide protection against 
the potential threat of keyloggers being present on the userÕs home 
computer. As mentioned before, Darknets [6] is a kind of privacy 
preserving service that is often tarred with the bad name 
associated with illegal activities such as sharing copyrighted 
materials or indecent images of children. This anonymous 
distributed peer-to-peer service is one example of how a good 
privacy solution could be misused to facilitate illegal activities. 
To summarise, given the functional requirements of privacy, 
maximal anonymity might not be practically useful for individuals 
and could circumvent accountability. Also, although privacy is a 
universal requirement that enables individuals to maintain 
different types of interactions, for some individuals the 
consequence of a breach of privacy protection could be 
psychological or physical harm including death, as described in 
more detail in the next section with the case of survivors of 
domestic violence. 
3. CASE STUDY: DESIGNING PRIVACY 
SOLUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
SURVIVORS 
A clear link has been established between issues of domestic 
violence and intimate partner cyber stalking [28][29]. Intimate 
partner cyber stalking refers to stalking conducted by current or 
ex-partner using a wide variety of information-based technology. 
The stalker or abuser has a high level of access to and knowledge 
about the habits of the survivor. As a result, intimate partner cyber 
stalking is a new and powerful weapon which adds to the ways in 
which the survivor can be controlled and/or coerced. 
Through a collaboration with an independent charity dealing with 
domestic and sexual violence in the north east of England, we 
have been in contact with survivors of domestic violence. This 
collaboration highlighted the barriers faced by domestic violence 
survivors in trying to use technology to find support and help. The 
major concern is that survivors are often reluctant to seek help Ð 
either from friends and family or from support organisations Ð 
because they are afraid that such actions will attract attention and 
that they may risk further abuse if discovered. There is also a 
concern that survivors often do not know where to get help from 
or they are not aware about services that are available. These 
concerns motivate us to investigate and explore the needs and 
challenges faced by survivors in accessing support services, which 
among others boil down to the need to protect survivorsÕ privacy 
while accessing online support services. 
3.1 Challenges 
Providing privacy solutions that are useful for and usable by 
everyone is practically an impossible task. We decide to focus on 
a group of users (domestic violence survivors), while keeping 
open the possibility of expanding the approach to other groups in 
society in general, and minimising the risks of our solutions being 
used for nefarious activities. Several key challenges have been 
identified below. 
3.1.1 User considerations 
¥ Catering for non tech-savvy users: users might lack the skills, 
awareness, or confidence in using technology in general, and 
privacy technology in particular.  
¥ Dealing with multiple devices: there is a real challenge to keep 
the consistency of private information and privacy settings on 
different devices. These tend to have a non-uniform way to 
manage their privacy settings, therefore exacerbating the first 
key challenge above. 
¥ Considering userÕs psychological profile: userÕs mental state 
could affect the effectiveness of the solution. While under 
duress and constant fear, it is inevitable that survivors might 
panic and struggle to use features that would normally be 
straightforward to use, or to miss certain precautionary 
routines.  
3.1.2 Mitigating misuse 
¥ Minimising potential misuse of the solution: users might twist 
the good features provided by the solution into something 
negative or even illegal. Privacy enhancing technologies are 
not immune from this challenge, as demonstrated by the use of 
Darknets by paedophiles for sharing images of sexual abuse of 
children, as well as the relatively recent seizure of Bitcoins 
digital currency due to an alleged drug law violation [30].  
3.2 Attacker Model 
The main potential attackers are the survivorsÕ partner (and 
abuser). Some key assumptions of these abusers are given below: 
¥ They have access to or control of the (shared) computer at 
home and/or even the survivorsÕ smartphones. 
¥ They have sufficient computer knowledge (for example, they 
know how to check web browser history), but they are not a 
hacker or an expert in computer security or forensic. 
¥ They may monitor the survivorsÕ computer usage all the time, 
but they do not use a key logger or network sniffer. 
Nonetheless, it is expected that the attacker will be able to take 
control of the survivorÕs computer and/or smartphone after the 
survivor finishes using it to access domestic violence support 
websites, either blatantly (even by force) or discreetly. 
Therefore one of the main aims of our proposed solutions is to 
remove traces of digital footprints associated with domestic 
violence support websites from any devices used by the survivors. 
3.3 Sample Solution: Selective Sanitation of 
Smartphone History 
The Selective Sanitation of Smartphone History app aims to allow 
survivors to freely access online resources whilst hiding their 
activities from their abusers. The objective of this solution is to 
automatically erase the digital footprints left behind when a 
survivor accesses specific domestic violence support websites, or 
when they make/receive a call (or send/receive a text message) 
to/from phone numbers associated to domestic violence support 
services. The app leaves intact all other history entries, thereby 
avoiding making it look like the phone has been cleaned. The way 
the app is designed reflects the key challenges outlined in Section 
3.1, as well as the attacker model described in Section 3.2: 
¥ The app is very easy to use; in fact it does not require user 
interaction at all once it has been installed on the smartphone. 
In order not to draw attention to itself (due to the very high 
likelihood that the abuser might demand the survivor to hand 
over their smartphone), the app is hidden behind an innocent 
front end, such as a game app or an image gallery app, so that 
it is not obvious for the abuser that the survivor has this app 
running on their smartphone. 
¥ The app is designed to run on multiple Android platforms, and 
it has no adjustments/settings to worry about. The list of which 
websites or phone numbers to sanitise is currently embedded in 
the app, with future version envisaged to have this list hosted 
online with a feature to download the updated list discreetly 
when a new list becomes available. 
¥ The effectiveness of the solution does not depend on the userÕs 
mental state. The app runs as a background service that is 
automatically turned on when the smartphone is started. It 
routinely carries out the sanitation actions every few minutes, 
so that the survivor is not required to remember about 
executing the sanitation actions. 
¥ To minimise the potential risk of the app being misused to 
erase access history to illegal websites, the app does not go as 
deep as cleaning the SQLite database used for storing these 
history entries. In other words, forensics experts should still be 
able to piece back information from the SQLite database (a 
recent report [31] indicates that it is possible to recover data 
from Android devices even after a factory reset); however this 
should be enough to raise the barrier to prevent the expected 
attacker (the survivorÕs abusive partner) to find out about an 
attempt by the survivor to find help. 
3.3.1 Other bite-size solutions 
In addition to the solution described above, our approach consists 
of a number of complementary technologies that provide bite-size 
protection [4]: 
¥ To distribute information to survivors, QR codes (that can be 
embedded on everyday things such as mugs and postcards) and 
NFC tags built in location-based service advertising in public 
places have been implemented.  
¥ The QR codes are implemented as single-shot URL, which 
means that the first time the link is used, it will direct survivor 
to the domestic violence support website, but any subsequent 
access will be directed to an innocuous or safe page, such as 
the postcard makerÕs website. 
¥ A secret graphical gateway has also been implemented to allow 
survivors to Òremember" a support website without adding the 
link as a bookmark. This gateway avoids the obvious 
interactive feature of login-password: the application is 
disguised as an image gallery that displays a set of pictures, 
one of which authenticates the user when clicked in the right 
sequence at the right coordinates. 
3.4 Sensible Privacy Recommendations 
Taking into account the challenges and attacker model outlined in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we propose sensible privacy as a design that 
would allow the solution to address the intended usersÕ needs, 
while at the same time minimising the risks of the solution being 
misused for illegal or other harmful activities. We formulate the 
lessons learned for implementing sensible privacy as follows: 
1. Account for the varying technical ability and psychological 
state of users.  
2. Design privacy solutions that work straight out of the box, i.e. 
they do not need special knowledge or complicated set-up 
procedure. 
3. Make sure the proposed solution is not self-defeating, i.e. the 
solution should not inadvertently cause more harm to its users. 
4. Account for human nature and weaknesses, such as sharing 
information with family and friends, which might lead to a life-
threatening situation. 
5. Include not only one privacy mechanism, but rather a set of 
mechanisms that complement each other in anticipation of 
potential attack vectors. 
6. Ensure user privacy protection is appropriate to the attacker 
model.  
7. Strive for a strong enough design without hindering law 
enforcement agents in performing their duties should the need 
arise.  
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we present a domestic violence scenario where 
privacy is required for the protection of life. We propose a 
Òsensible privacyÓ design that we argue can be achieved via 
usable complementary bite-size protection (suited to the user 
requirements as well as to the attacker model) that also mitigates 
misuse. In such contexts, the sensible privacy design accounts for 
individualsÕ habits and preferences and does not need to provide 
complete or maximal anonymity. Instead, it enables users to 
include technology as part of their life but be able to provide 
assurance against life-threatening harms that could result from 
privacy breach. Importantly, the sensible privacy design ensures 
support for accountability to avoid misuse by perpetrators and 
cybercriminals.    
The work presented in this paper forms part of our continuing 
research aimed at proposing a holistic approach to support 
domestic violence survivors and other vulnerable groups in 
accessing support services while maintaining their privacy. We 
cannot currently confirm with certainty that our solutions provide 
the sensible privacy as defined in this paper. However, we believe 
this approach provides a structured method to explore the problem 
domain. We aim to iteratively evaluate the usability and 
effectiveness of these solutions in controlled settings with role-
play, as well as through other methodologies such as gamification.  
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